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The regulations that shape the design and the operations of corporations, credit and securities markets differ 
vastly from country to country. In addition, similar regulations are often unequally enforced in different 
countries. Economists still have an imperfect understanding of why these international differences exist and of 
whether they tend to persist over time. However, a recent strand of research has shown that some progress on 
these issues can be made using the approach of the new political economy, which models regulation and its 
enforcement as the result of the balance of power between social and economic constituencies. In this paper we 
offer a first assessment of the results and potential of this approach in three fields: corporate finance, banking 
and securities markets.  
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1. Introduction 
During the Great Depression, U.S. farmers oppressed by the rising burden of 
mortgages and by falling incomes successfully pressed their states’ legislators to pass 
laws for debt moratoria of farm mortgages. To further support farmers’ incomes, the 
Roosevelt administration devalued the dollar against gold, and abrogated all gold 
clauses in private debt contracts that would have otherwise triggered a wave of 
bankruptcies (Kroszner, 1998). While relieving distressed farmers, the policy had 
adverse consequences for their further access to credit: in states which enacted farm 
foreclosure moratorium laws, banks extended fewer farm loans and charged higher 
interest rates (Alston, 1984). 
At the same time, on the other side of the Atlantic, the Great Depression prompted 
another form of political intervention. In Italy, the Fascist government launched a 
massive bailout of failing industrial firms and banks, and transferred the equity stakes 
acquired in the process to a public agency, the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale 
(IRI). Initially designed as a temporary remedy to the crisis, IRI grew into a state-run 
giant holding group that dominated the Italian economy for the rest of the century, and 
largely replaced securities markets in financing Italian heavy industry and utilities. 
Political and social turmoil was also at the root of “codetermination”, by which 
German employees select half of the supervisory board of large companies. This 
system, which had long-lasting implications for the governance of German companies, 
was initially introduced by a 1922 law of the Weimar Republic, in order to strike a 
compromise between the right and the left and achieve a minimal degree of political 
stability in a deeply divided country. Repealed under the Nazi regime, this arrangement 
was reinstated in 1951 for the Ruhr steel and coal industry by Konrad Adenauer. 
Conscious of the tremendous political role played by the Ruhr industry in inter-war 
Germany, he felt that democracy should be combined with constraints over the use of 
private capital, a notion labeled as “economic democracy”. In 1976, the 
Codetermination Law extended equal representation of employees and shareholders to 
all companies with more than 2,000 employees. This arrangement, still in force in 
Germany, tends to shield management from the market for corporate control, by 
reinforcing employees’ power to resist mergers or takeovers, and diminishes control 
over management by fractionalizing the supervisory board and making it a potential 
vehicle for collusion between managers and workers (Pistor, 1999).   8 
Political intervention in financial markets does not occur only at times of systemic 
crisis and social turmoil such as the Great Depression. The action of pressure groups 
and the career concerns of politicians often combine to produce specific political 
interventions in financial markets, such as nationalizations, privatizations, bailouts, 
vetoes to mergers and takeovers, etc. Consider the two following examples. 
In 1976 six bankrupt U.S. railroad companies were nationalized with the creation of 
Conrail under the pressure of interest groups, formed by customers, existing claimants 
and employees, mostly located in the Northeast. After 11 years, Conrail was privatized. 
Over this period, the U.S. government had outlays of $6.59 billion and received cash 
flow of $6.15 billion, implying an internal rate of return of -1.62 percent.  During the 
period 1976-87, the major customers of the six bankrupt companies contributed over 
$14 million to both Democrats and Republicans and to key members of the House 
Energy and Commerce Committee. The benefits to Conrail’s customers amounted to 
over $2,774 million (Ang and Boyer, 2000). 
In March 1997, Krupp made a DM 15 billion hostile bid for Thyssen AG, a 
corporation previously trading at DM 12 billion on the Frankfurt stock exchange. The 
managers of the target company rallied politicians, workers’ unions and media to its 
rescue, arguing that the raider intended to predate on the company and its workers to 
pay its shareholders. Thyssen’s campaign was successful: Krupp withdrew its offer and 
agreed to a management-friendly merger later on, while the stock market value of 
Thyssen went back to DM 12 billion (Hellwig, 2000, p. 28). 
These examples illustrate that politics can interfere with financial markets in several 
ways. In recent years economists have developed a new approach to analyze 
systematically the impact of politics on the economy, treating policy-makers as self-
interested agents responding to political incentives. This approach, known as “new 
political economy”, contrasts sharply with the view of policy-makers as “benevolent 
social planners”, which is a common hypothesis in welfare economics. The political 
economy approach was initially applied to macroeconomic policy-making, but is now 
spreading to other areas of economic policy analysis. In this paper we show how its 
tools and ideas can be applied to the analysis of policy interventions in financial 
markets, building on the first body of contributions in this field.   9 
Which insights can we hope to get by applying the political economy approach to 
finance? First and foremost, we can hope to understand why often financial regulation is 
flawed and stifles – rather than fostering – the development of the markets to which it 
applies. In other words, it helps us to understand why some countries end up with 
“poorly designed” financial institutions or “poorly enforced” financial regulation. 
Second, political economy can give us a clue as to when and why one can expect 
financial regulation or its enforcement to change over time. In other words, it guides us 
in the understanding of “financial reform” and of its feasibility. It does so by explaining 
which constituencies are sustaining a certain regulatory outcome, why they are currently 
dictating the rules, and how and why the balance of power can shift against them. 
Thirdly, besides explaining how pressure groups affect regulation, political economy 
takes into account how in turn regulation shapes and entrenches political constituencies 
via its economic effects. In this sense, legal rules and economic outcomes are jointly 
determined, politics being the link between them. This interdependence is illustrated 
schematically in Figure 1. 
In Table 1 we indicate various ways through which politicians can interfere with 
financial markets. They can either change the “rules of the game” or intervene on a 
case-by-case basis. In both instances, political interventions can affect the financial 
decisions of corporations, the working of the banking industry, or the operation of 
security markets. The table also indicates relevant research, where available. 
Each of the next three sections of the paper deals with one of the three types of 
interaction between politics and finance indicated in the columns of Table 1, which can 
serve as a road map for the reader. The table should not, however, be taken as a rigid 
and exhaustive classification. For instance, specific policy interventions can durably 
change the rules as perceived by the generality of market participants. If the government 
repeatedly bails out distressed banks, bank managers may come to regard this as a 
systematic policy and change their attitudes towards risk-taking accordingly. Similarly, 
public interventions in one area may have spillovers in other areas. For example, the 
protection of minority shareholders can affect not only corporate financial policies but 
also the development of securities markets, as we shall see in the next section. 
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2. Politics and Corporate Finance 
Politics can affect the balance of power between company “insiders” (managers and 
controlling shareholders) and “outsiders” (non-controlling shareholders), in keeping 
with Hellwig’s (2000) distinction. It does so by designing the rules intended to protect 
minority shareholders, as well as those that influence the contestability of corporate 
control. The State can have an even more direct influence over the life of companies by 
taking a direct stake in their ownership structure or by divesting from them, as it has 
happened with the recent worldwide privatization wave. In this section we analyze 
political interventions in all these areas. 
 
2.1 Corporate governance 
Recent contributions on corporate governance show that there are large differences in 
the degree of investor protection across countries and that these differences are 
correlated with both the development of capital markets and the ownership structure of 
firms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 1998).  The argument is 
that better legal protection for investors and stricter law enforcement reduce the risk of 
expropriation by managers and controlling shareholders. Through this channel, better 
legal protection and stricter enforcement enable firms to raise more external capital, and 
thus enhance the growth of capital markets. However, the degree of investor protection 
and its enforcement are not exogenous variables. They are can be altered via the 
political process, which in turn may respond to economic interests.  
Some suggest that political choices that shape investor protection and its enforcement 
are simply driven by ideological factors. For example, Roe (1999) argues that the 
differences between the corporate governance systems in the Unites States and in 
Continental Europe are due to the incompatibility of the American ideology with the 
kind of social democracy common in European countries. According to Roe, in Europe 
the State is entrusted with the task of sustaining a social pact between all classes, 
whereby greater equality is exchanged for reduced efficiency.  
Others argue that history, as summarized by the country’s legal origin, entirely 
determines the degree of investor protection and its enforcement within a country. La 
Porta, et al. (1998) show that countries whose commercial law was inspired by the 
French Civil code exhibit lower protection for minority shareholders and creditors and   11 
laxer law enforcement than countries with a commercial law inspired by the English 
common law tradition. Countries with German and Scandinavian legal origin exhibit 
intermediate levels of creditor and shareholder protection, and law enforcement. Since 
the origin of a country’s legal system is the outcome of choices made centuries ago, this 
“law and finance” approach (as discussed by Levine in this issue) implies that a country 
with French legal origin is inexorably condemned to low legal protection and lax 
enforcement, and therefore to financial underdevelopment.
1 
Political economy models distance themselves both from the view that the degree of 
investor protection is driven by ideology, and from the view that it is dictated by a long-
run historical imprinting of national law. They depart from the first view, since they 
regard political decisions as based on economic interests, not on ideology. They depart 
from the second approach because politicians can change laws if they choose to do it. 
Political economy models can address the key issue of legal reform, on which the “law 
and finance” approach is mute: they can be used to analyze if and when the political 
balance can change and precipitate a change in the legal system and in economic 
outcomes. This is because in these models the State is an agent for political forces that 
reflect the conflicting economic interests of their constituencies. By affecting the design 
and enforcement of legal rules, the balance of power between constituencies affects the 
allocation of control rights between the company’s stakeholders – shareholders, 
managers, workers and possibly customers. This balance of power and the implied 
legislation thus shapes the objective function of companies, determining the relative 
weights that they place on shareholder value, employees’ welfare, etc. (Tirole, 2001). 
A political-economy model of investor protection is set forth in Pagano and Volpin 
(2000). In their setting, the relevant stakeholders are controlling shareholders, non-
controlling shareholders, and employees. Controlling shareholders (“entrepreneurs”) 
want low investor protection to extract larger private benefits of control, and may obtain 
it with the political support of workers. To win such support in electoral competition, 
they have to make some concession to workers, that in the model takes the form of 
limiting their discretion in firing decisions. The feasibility of this “corporatist” 
                                                 
1 Evidence in Rajan and Zingales (2001) suggests that the result in La Porta, et al. (1998) does not 
generalize to the past. At the beginning of the 20
th century, France had more developed capital markets 
than the US. We will come back to this issue in sections 2.3 and 4. 
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agreement – or “stakeholder society”, as others call it – depends on the political process 
and on the distribution of equity ownership in the economy.  
If the political system favors the formation of party coalitions or if workers own little 
or no equity, entrepreneurs and workers will strike a political agreement whereby 
workers trade low shareholder protection for high job security. This agreement enables 
both social groups to preserve their rents. Low shareholder protection increases the 
entrepreneurs’ private benefits of control, while high employee protection enables low-
productivity workers to extract rents from restructuring companies in the form of 
severance pay. If instead the political system does not favor the formation of coalitions 
or if workers’ participation to the stock market is extensive, legislation will feature high 
shareholder protection and low employee protection.
2 
These predictions are consistent with the empirical evidence for OECD countries, 
where one observes two distinct clusters, as shown in Figure 2. Continental European 
countries and Japan, whose governments are generally formed by coalitions, have low 
investor and high employment protection. Conversely, Anglo-Saxon countries, whose 
political systems have the opposite features, have high investor and low employee 
protection. This agrees with survey evidence on the objectives pursued by major 
companies in Japan, France, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S., reported in Allen and 
Gale (2000) and reproduced in Table 2. Asked whether a company should pursue the 
interest of all stakeholders or give priority to shareholders’ interests, most Japanese, 
German and France managers replied that companies are to be managed in the interest 
of all stakeholders. Instead, the majority of U.K. and U.S. managers asserted that 
priority must be given to the interest of shareholders. This squares with the replies to 
another question posed in the same survey: whether executives should give priority to 
dividend payments or to employment protection. The majority of Japanese, French and 
German executives answered that employment should be kept stable, even at cost of 
reducing dividends. In the U.K. and U.S., the pattern of replies was the opposite. 
Within OECD countries, the divide between non-corporatist and corporatist countries 
coincides with that between common-law countries and civil-law countries. So one 
                                                 
2 Perotti and von Thadden (2001) propose an alternative political economy model, where companies can 
issue either debt or equity. In their setting, both creditors and workers tend to prefer a less risky 
environment even when this reduces profits, so that they will tend to be political allies against 
shareholders, and will tend to support bank- over equity-dominance. 
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could observe that this political economy model is observationally equivalent to the 
“law and finance” claim that shareholder protection is predetermined by legal origin. 
However, the political economy model places much more stringent demands on the data 
than the “law and finance” view, insofar as it ties both the degree of shareholder 
protection and the degree of employment protection to the design of the constitutional 
system. Table 3 documents that the model passes this test. If OECD countries are 
partitioned based on the two clusters in Figure 2,
3 “corporatist” countries turned out to 
be those where coalition governments are commonplace and where governments are 
subject to a confidence vote procedure. By the same token, the model predicts that a 
constitutional reform that impedes coalition governments will precipitate a “non-
corporatist” outcome – a prediction on which the passage of time will probably pass its 
verdict. 
Both in Japan and in some Continental European countries, the high degree of 
employee protection observed in Figure 2 resulted from a political agreement struck in 
the immediate postwar period and reinforced by later legislation. This political 
agreement also tended to give employees a limited involvement in the direction of 
companies. In Japan, according to Gilson and Roe (1999), lifetime employment grew 
out of a postwar political deal aimed at reducing labor unrest and restore entrepreneurs’ 
control over factories. Similarly, in various European countries, the postwar period 
witnessed both increasing employment protection and various experiments with 
employee participation in corporate governance (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000). 
The model by Pagano and Volpin highlights that a potential cost of “corporatism” is 
under-investment or at least under-provision of external finance.  To the extent that it 
leads management to extract high benefits of control and forsake shareholder value 
maximization, this social arrangement tends to produce an ex-ante inefficiency in the 
form of equity rationing: fearing that their cash flow rights will be diluted by 
management and by controlling shareholders, non-controlling shareholders will limit 
the availability of equity finance to companies, and thereby will constrain the size of the 
initial investment. Of course, this cost matters particularly to new companies, which still 
need to fund their investments, not to incumbent entrepreneurs for whom such cost is 
already largely sunk. This suggests that while established entrepreneurs may favor low 
                                                 
3 Corporatist countries being those for which employment protection exceeds 1.5 and shareholder 
protection is not larger than 4, and non-corporatist countries being the complement of this set.   14 
shareholder protection, the opposite will be true for the owners of startup companies. 
Tirole (2001) highlights that under-investment is not the only cost of stakeholder 
capitalism. This arrangement may also hamper managerial effectiveness, due to 
deadlocks in decision-making and lack of clear mission for management. 
Roe (1994) and Bebchuck and Roe (1999) point out that the composition of the 
group of company “insiders” (employees, managers and controlling shareholders) 
differs across countries and this may explain the divergence in corporate governance 
between Continental Europe and the U.S. They argue that the key difference between 
European and American companies is their ownership structure: American companies 
do not have controlling shareholders. Without a controlling shareholder, managers have 
considerably more power and can protect their rents by lobbying politicians. According 
to Roe (1994), this may explain the U.S. regulatory effort in the 20
th century to restrain 
the power of large blockholders and banks and prevent the emergence of controlling 
shareholders. On the other hand, in Continental Europe ownership has historically been 
concentrated and managers have always been weak. Hence, no such regulation has been 
introduced. This explanation naturally predicts path dependence, as argued by Bebchuck 
and Roe (1999), because the corporate structures created by a certain political balance 
of power in the past affect the political balance of power in the future. 
It is interesting to ask what political economy can tell us about the future evolution of 
the corporate governance systems, especially for countries in Continental Europe, that 
feature low investor protection and high employment protection. Many legal scholars 
believe that competition will ensure a certain degree of convergence. Hansmann and 
Kraakman (2000) predict that national corporate law itself will tend to converge to a 
single standard. Coffee (1999) suggests that differences between corporate governance 
systems will persist, but that some functional convergence will occur. Gilson (2000) 
takes an eclectic stance, envisaging an interplay of functional convergence, convergence 
“by contract” and institutional persistence, with a range of different potential outcomes. 
In contrast, Bebchuk and Roe (1999) question the idea of convergence towards an 
optimal and unified system of corporate governance, arguing, as just remarked, that 
political and economic forces condition the dynamics of corporate governance rules in 
different countries and generate path dependence. The same prediction arises from the 
model by Pagano and Volpin (2000), to the extent that people expect the current legal 
regime to persist over time. However, expectations about the future legal regime may   15 
change under the impact of exogenous increases in the diffusion of share ownership. 
These can induce political support for improved shareholder protection, in turn 
enhancing more widespread share ownership. Examples of such exogenous shocks are 
privatization programs, the introduction of private pension funds, employee-stock 
ownership funds, or simply the spread of  “equity culture”.  
 
2.2. Market for corporate control 
The contestability of corporate control is an alternative way of limiting the “private 
benefits” of control that managers and controlling shareholders can extract at the 
expense of non-controlling shareholders. To a certain extent, an active market for 
corporate control can substitute for shareholder protection in aligning managerial 
incentives with firm value maximization. By the same token, the political economy of 
takeover legislation resembles that of shareholder protection. Managers and controlling 
shareholders are naturally supportive of allowing poison pills and other anti-takeover 
defenses in corporate charters, whereas non-controlling shareholders prefer banning or 
restricting such defenses, since they stand to gain from the contestability of control.  
In this conflict, employees tend naturally to side with the incumbent management 
and controlling shareholders, since a takeover generally endangers the stability of their 
employment or at least threatens the salary and the power that they have secured within 
the company’s hierarchy. Therefore an additional feature of a “corporatist” arrangement 
will generally be a restrictive takeover code. However, even in a non-corporatist country 
such as the United States, political pressure by managers and employees restricted 
takeover activity in the last decade. Following the large wave of hostile takeovers and 
restructuring activity of the 1980s, when almost half of major U.S. corporations 
received a takeover offer, “managers … fought takeovers with legal maneuvers and by 
enlisting political and popular support. They were successful in that hostile takeovers 
became more costly in the 1990s” (Holmström and Kaplan, 2001, p. 122). 
Besides coalescing at the political level to promote restrictive takeover legislation, 
managers and workers can be natural allies in opposing the contestability of control at 
the company level. Pagano and Volpin (2001) show that, if the private benefits of 
control are high and the equity stake of management is small, managers have the 
incentive to transform employees into a “poison pill” by signing generous long-term   16 
labor contracts and thereby reducing the firm’s attractiveness to a raider. To the extent 
that a successful raider can renegotiate their labor contracts, employees will instead act 
as “white squires” for the incumbent managers.
4 They will lobby against hostile 
takeovers to protect the high wages enjoyed under incumbent management, as in the 
attempted 1997 takeover of Thyssen by Krupp described in the introduction of this 
paper. Workers prefer dealing with the incumbent manager than with a raider because 
the manager is more lenient in his monitoring policy and therefore ends up paying 
higher salaries to motivate workers. The incumbent manager has the incentive to be 
lenient and generous with the workers, since his compensation arises more from the 
private benefits of control than from the firm’s security benefits, and by being lenient he 
avoids the cost of monitoring employees intensively. In equilibrium, the workers’ 
expected wages are increasing in the management’s private benefits, and are inversely 
related to the success probability of the takeover.  
The equity stake that management holds in the company is a key parameter in the 
model: owning a higher stake tends to align the managers’ objectives to shareholder 
value maximization, and therefore makes them more willing to accept the contestability 
of control over the company. This situation seems to fit well with the more 
accommodating view that recently U.S. corporate managers have taken towards 
takeovers relative to the past: “Thanks to lucrative stock option plans, managers could 
share in the market returns from restructured companies. Shareholder value became an 
ally rather than an enemy” (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001, p. 122). 
These models of corporate stakeholders’ behavior highlight that whenever low 
shareholder protection allows the extraction of control rents from a company, workers 
and managers become natural allies in sharing such rents. This provides an additional 
reason, at the level of the individual company, why managers and workers might vote 
jointly in favor of low shareholder protection or of control-sharing arrangements such as 
codetermination. 
 
                                                 
4 A “white squire” is a third party friendly to management who helps the company avoid an unwanted 
takeover without taking over the company on its own.   17 
2.3. Public Ownership of Companies 
In the last twenty years, the governments of many countries have carried out large-
scale privatization programs that have deeply changed the functioning of formerly state-
owned corporations and that of financial markets at large. Privatizations have generally 
been driven by the objective to retire government debt or reduce its growth, to increase 
the efficiency of state-owned corporations and to promote competition in formerly 
monopolistic sectors of the economy such as utilities (Megginson and Netter, 2000).  
However, privatization programs may also have served political purposes, even at the 
cost of revenue maximization. Such political motivations may have affected both the 
design of the sale procedure and the decision itself to privatize state-owned enterprises. 
According to the model by Perotti (1995), a government that is ideologically committed 
to privatization and economic reform will privatize in stages (retaining a passive stake 
while transferring control), to signal its commitment not to interfere ex post with the 
privatized company under the pressure of other stakeholders. In contrast, a “populist” 
government that pursues privatization simply as a means to raise revenue will sell the 
entire stock at the market price. In addition, if retaining a sufficiently large government 
stake in the company conflicts with the transfer of control to the private sector, Perotti 
shows that a committed government will deliberately underprice the shares it sells, so as 
to signal its intentions credibly. A populist government will not be willing to underprice 
as much as a committed government, to avoid reducing its revenue from the 
privatization.  
The government can even design the privatization so as to increase the voters’ 
support for its policies. Biais and Perotti (2001) show that allocating a significant 
amount of shares to median class voters can help a conservative policy–maker steer 
them in favor of more conservative policies. “This is not the result of gratitude: rather, 
their shareholdings make them averse to elect politicians whose redistributive policies 
would reduce the value of their investment” (p. 2). Since median voters are generally 
not wealthy, however, they will not be inclined to buy a significant amount of shares in 
privatized companies unless these are offered at a large discount. This provides an 
additional reason why a committed (or conservative) government will tend to 
underprice the shares of the companies it privatizes. 
The political motivation of establishing “popular capitalism”, in Margaret Thatcher’s 
quite explicit words, may explain the large underpricing observed in many privatization   18 
programs. According to Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2001), initial private 
offerings (IPOs) are 13.7 percentage points more underpriced for privatizations than for 
other companies, controlling for other factors.
5 Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter 
(1999) test if such underpricing conforms to the predictions of the political economy 
models by Perotti (1995) and Biais and Perotti (2001), using a large data set.
6 They find 
that underpricing is positively and significantly related to the degree of income 
inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient), in line with Biais and Perotti’s (2001) 
point that in the presence of greater income inequality greater underpricing is necessary 
to lure the median voter. A dummy variable for British privatizations also features a 
positive and significant coefficient, reflecting the view that the Thatcher’s government 
set particularly low share prices to pursue its objectives of widening share ownership 
and reducing government intervention. Underpricing is instead negatively related to the 
level of government spending as a fraction of GDP. If public spending proxies for a 
government’s “populist” orientation, this result conforms with the common prediction 
of Perotti (1995) and Biais and Perotti (2001) that a populist government is more 
motivated by revenue than by the need to signal its commitment or to plant the seeds of 
“popular capitalism”. Finally, underpricing is lower if the government sells more than 
50 percent of the shares, in agreement with Perotti’s (1995) prediction that if a 
government can transfer control via its initial sale, it does not need to rely on 
underpricing to signal its commitment. In their study, Jones et al. (1999) control for 
motives for privatization other than political reasons, by including the government 
deficit as a proxy for the government’s need to raise revenue. 
Political motivations can also contribute to determine the timing of privatization. 
This often occurs in waves, under governments with free-market views, especially when 
impending elections posed a potential threat to the continuation of free-market policies. 
Examples occurred in the U.K. and in France under the right-wing rule of the 1980s and 
early 1990s, as well as in Chile before the transition to democracy and in the Czech 
republic in the early stages of the transition to the free market. The importance of 
politics in the timing of privatizations is supported by the evidence in Bortolotti, 
                                                 
5 Ljunqvist et al. (2001) use a sample of 2,143 IPOs (10.8 percent of which are privatizations) from 65 
non U.S. markets. In their IPO underpricing regressions, the coefficient of the privatization dummy is 
statistically significant at the 1-percent confidence level. They control for country, year and sector effects, 
as well as for various features of the privatization method, such as reliance on bookbuilding  or a fixed-
price method, and whether bookbuilding was effected by a U.S. bank and/or targeted at U.S. investors.   19 
Siniscalco and Fantini (2000), who evaluate empirically the relative importance of 
political, legal and economic factors in privatizations, relying on a sample of 49 
countries for the period 1977-96. They find that the number of privatization sales are 
higher in countries with governments supported by conservative coalitions and with 
higher pre-privatization fiscal deficits, while privatization revenues per capita are 
strongly correlated with measures of financial market development and of government 
credibility. Political variables are also important in the choice of the sale method: 
conservative-backed governments tend to favor large share offerings, in line with Biais 
and Perotti’s (2001) view that the diffusion of share ownership is one of their 
objectives. 
In a longer-term perspective, privatization can be regarded as the final stage of a 
historical process that in most countries started many decades ago, with extensive 
nationalizations or the ex-novo establishment of publicly owned companies, especially 
in the utilities, heavy industry and financial sectors. This direct intervention of the State 
as entrepreneur largely replaced or, according to others, crowded out the role of the 
private sector in the accumulation of capital. In Europe, this massive State intervention 
occurred at the time of the Great Depression, as the State picked up the pieces of 
bankrupt private companies and of distressed banks and tried to revive the economy 
with its intervention. For instance, in Italy the government concentrated the shares of 
most large companies and banks in the State-controlled agency known as IRI. 
In the United States, the government faced similar challenges but for the most part it 
intervened in a different fashion: as a regulator of private markets rather than as their 
substitute. In the wake of the Great Depression, Congress passed several pieces of 
legislation designed to curb the power of large banks and securities houses held 
responsible for the crisis: the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act prevented commercial banks 
from underwriting, holding and dealing in corporate securities, the 1933 Securities Act 
mandated disclosure in the securities markets, and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act 
established and empowered the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). These three 
laws laid out the institutional foundations of the spectacular development of securities 
markets in the United States for the rest of the century. 
                                                                                                                                               
6 Their sample includes 630 share issue privatizations in 59 countries with total proceeds of over $ 446 
billion during the period 1977-97.   20 
Such laws, intended to protect investors and reassure them about the stability and 
transparency of financial markets, were obviously not necessary in the context of 
European countries, where the State had taken a direct and massive role in 
intermediating and allocating capital. Partly as a result of this, securities market 
remained relatively undeveloped in European economies, and in some of them declined 
to a lower level of activity and sophistication than in the late 19
th and early 20
th century. 
Why did Continental Europe and the United States react so differently to the Great 
Depression? Rajan and Zingales (2001) offer a number of explanations, based on 
differences in the political system, in the balance of power between pressure groups and 
in ideological traditions. For instance, in the United States President Roosevelt’s plans 
to introduce extensive State intervention and planning in the economy were halted by 
the combined pressure of the judiciary and of conservative pressure groups. Obviously, 
no comparable system of checks and balances was in place in Fascist Italy, in Nazi 
Germany or in imperial Japan. 
However, the European dirigiste response was not without efficiency costs, at least 
in the long run. State control of companies and banks generated soft budget constraints 
for managers, with the implied agency problems, and offered to politicians the 
opportunity to extract large rents. These inefficiencies were reflected into growing 
public debt, which eventually required privatization as one of the remedies.  
The remaining question is why privatizations had to wait as long as the end of the 
20
th century – why, in other words, the cumulative effects of the inefficiencies of State 
control on public debt had to become so large before corrective action was taken. The 
political economy literature may be helpful also in this respect. In macroeconomics, it 
has shed light on the timing and delay of monetary and fiscal stabilizations by modeling 
the political conflict over the sharing of the burden of reform, as in the “war of attrition” 
models described by Drazen (2000). 
 
 3. Politics and Banking 
Banking regulation is another arena where political factors can play a role. A major 
source of conflict is that between large and small banks, who may be affected in 
opposite ways by the implied changes in banking competition. Another area of conflict 
is the balance between the protection of creditor rights and that of debtor interests in the   21 
design of bankruptcy law and in the choice to concede moratoria or bail out insolvent 
borrowers or banks. 
 
3.1. Branching restrictions and deposit insurance 
Kroszner and Strahan (1999) provide a very accurate empirical analysis of the 
political economy of banking regulation, in the context of the United States. Before 
1970, all states forbade interstate branching. Since then, all but one of the states relaxed 
this restriction. The authors show that the timing of the deregulation of bank branching 
across the United States has been determined by the relative strength of the interests 
groups affected by the reform.  
The deregulation involved three types of reforms. The first was the permission to 
own multiple banks but operate them separately. The second and crucial step was the 
permission to branch by mergers and acquisition. The full deregulation consisted in the 
permission of statewide branching. The authors focus on the second of these reforms.  
Within a state, the people that obviously stood to benefit from branching 
deregulation were the customers most dependent on bank finance since branching 
deregulation tends to reduce banks’ local market power. Losers from branching 
deregulation were instead the small banks, who stood to be swallowed by large rivals. 
The hypothesis tested by Kroszner and Strahan is that if these interest groups had an 
impact on the decision by state politicians to deregulate, deregulation should have 
occurred earlier where banks were relatively larger and firms more bank dependent. 
This is precisely what the authors find: deregulation occurred earlier in states where 
small banks were relatively less prominent in number and financial strength, and where 
companies were smaller and therefore depended vitally on bank finance. The pattern of 
deregulation had a first-order impact on the level of economic activity across the States, 
as persuasively shown by Jayaratne and Strahan (1996). 
 Interest group variables also explain the voting pattern of legislators in the U.S. 
House of Representatives on banking reform at the federal level. Kroszner and Strahan 
(2000) extend this type of analysis to the vote by individual legislators on the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. They show that votes were 
affected by private interest group factors, reflecting the contrasting interests of large 
versus small banks, and of banks versus insurance companies.   22 
 
3.2. Bankruptcy law, bailouts and moratoria 
Bankuptcy law has to tread a difficult balance between the protection of creditors, to 
promote the availability and cheap provision of credit, and the protection of debtors to 
prevent debt overhang, excessive liquidation of collateral and underprovision of 
screening by banks. A strong legal protection of creditors may be efficient ex ante, but 
creates inefficiencies ex post. For instance, it may exacerbate debt overhang problems. 
When any income earned after default must go to creditors, a debtor has little incentive 
to work, or, at least, to do any work that is legal. Other ex-post inefficiencies may be 
associated with collateral liquidation. Being more interested in recovering their money 
than in the overall company’s value, holders of collateral may strip the company of key 
assets and force its inefficient liquidation. Moreover, the liquidation of a firm can have 
negative externalities for third parties: for instance, it may inflict costs on employees 
who have invested in firm-specific human capital, or on suppliers or customers who 
have come to depend on the firm’s operation. Finally, strong legal protection of creditor 
rights over collateral may reduce their incentive to screen loan applications to an 
inefficiently low level (Manove, Padilla, and Pagano, 2001). 
Biais and Recasens (2001) argue that the socially optimal degree of creditor 
protection balances the ex-post inefficiencies of frequent firms’ liquidation, including 
its diffused social costs, with the ex-ante efficiency gains (especially more abundant 
credit) associated with strong creditor protection. They analyze how bankruptcy laws 
emerging from the political process can deviate from this social optimum, as each 
constituency fail to internalize the external effects of the law on the other constituencies. 
The poorest citizens favor a soft bankruptcy law, which reduces the social costs of 
liquidation, while upwardly mobile middle-class citizens vote for a tough law, which 
improves their access to credit. 
The balance between the ex ante inefficiency and the ex post efficiency of debtor-
friendly laws is present also in the analysis of debt moratoria. These have been at times 
introduced by law for sectors of the economy or the generality of borrowers: an example 
was the farm foreclosure moratorium approved by U.S. legislators in the 1930s. In some 
cases, such politically induced changes in the laws can be beneficial insofar as they 
“complete” private contracts. For instance, a loan contract may fail to specify what will 
happen if a bad harvest or a natural disaster hits the economy, making it very hard for   23 
borrowers to repay. Such a shock can, however, create a political majority in favor of a 
debt moratorium or of a bailout of insolvent borrowers. One may think that to secure the 
implied ex-post efficiency gain, society is bound to incur an ex-ante efficiency loss: 
anticipating this potential political intervention, creditors will be less willing to lend. 
While in certain cases this ex-ante efficiency loss may arise, Bolton and Rosenthal 
(2001) show that this need not be the case. In their model, with aggregate uncertainty, 
political intervention raises both ex-ante and ex-post efficiency, while bailouts do not 
affect the ex-ante equilibrium and raise efficiency ex post. These surprising results 
derive from the fact that in their model political intervention occurs specifically in the 
contingencies that private contracts are unable to foresee.
7 
At the empirical level, political economy models hold considerable promise in 
explaining both the particular design of bankruptcy law in a given country and some of 
the international differences in bankruptcy law. For instance, Berglöf and Rosenthal 
(2000) show that in the 19
th century bankruptcy law was one of the most controversial 
issues in the political debate in the U.S., and changed several times under the impact of 
shifting ideological boundaries as well as of changing economic concerns.  In the same 
vein, Posner (1997) explains that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which is the 
source of modern U.S. bankruptcy law, “reflects the interests of organized lobbyists, 
such as banks and other large creditors, bankruptcy judges, … and the institutional 
interests of members of Congress”. Politics can also help understand why for most of 
their history the U.S. have had a more debtor-friendly bankruptcy law than Britain. In 
the 19
th century, foreign (British) lenders had a strong presence in the U.S., and the poor 
were better represented in U.S. political legislative institutions than they were in British 
ones. To a large extent, U.S. bankruptcy law took its current shape through a sequel of 
crises (the 1898 debt moratoria, the Great Depression) where borrowers negotiated 




4. Politics and Securities Markets 
According to Rajan and Zingales (2001), the historical development of securities 
markets has not followed a monotonic path, but has featured accelerations and retreats. 
                                                 
7 Political factors can also affect the regulator’s decision to close down distressed banks as analyzed for 
instance by Holthausen and Rønde (2001).   24 
For instance, in contrast with the current situation, until the beginning of the 20
th 
century many civil law countries had very developed security markets by international 
standards, contradicting the view that the origin of legal systems largely predetermines 
the degree of financial development.
8 Based on the analysis of data for 24 countries for 
the most of the 20
th century, Rajan and Zingales argue that politics – as driven by 
special-interest groups representing established business – can explain this uneven 
evolution of capital markets. Incumbents oppose financial development because it 
produces fewer benefits for them than for potential competitors. Incumbents can finance 
investment opportunities mainly with retained earnings, while potential competitors 
need external capital to start up.  
However, the incumbents’ opposition to financial development weakens when they 
face extraordinary opportunities to grow, especially abroad. In these instances, even 
established business pressures politicians to open product and financial markets to 
foreign competition. Once markets are open to foreign competition, it becomes 
unprofitable for incumbents to insist on keeping an under-developed capital market. The 
prediction is that the overhaul of securities markets regulation is part and parcel of a 
transition to free trade. 
Rajan and Zingales do not indicate which specific reforms of securities market 
regulation are associated with “financial development”. However, the literature on 
market microstructure suggests that well-functioning securities markets require 
regulation that minimizes the information asymmetries between market participants: the 
repression of insider trading and the timely disclosure and dissemination of information 
by publicly traded companies can reduce adverse selection problems in securities 
markets. To the extent that adverse selection generates gains for informed speculators 
and inflicts losses on uninformed investors, the latter require an ex ante discount on the 
price of securities when these are issued. Equivalently, adverse selection in securities 
markets translates into a higher cost of external capital for companies. Recent evidence 
by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2001) supports this prediction of the theory and 
underscores the importance of the enforcement of insider trading regulations, rather than 
their mere existence. They find that the cost of equity (after controlling for risk factors, 
                                                 
8  In addition, irrespective of its current shortcomings, civil law has not always been less suited to 
business needs than common law. Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2001) produce striking evidence that in the 
19
th century the French Code de Commerce and legal practice offered more sophisticated and flexible 
solutions to organize business than the Anglo-American legal regime.   25 
a liquidity factor, and other shareholder rights) is reduced by about 5 percent if insider 
trading laws are enforced. 
Why don’t all countries then enforce insider trading regulation with equal strictness? 
Again, political economy may provide the answer. For established companies, the cost 
of equity capital is a mainly a sunk cost, since they already raised most of the external 
finance they need and can rely on a steady flow of retained earnings to fund new 
investment. In addition, the managers and controlling shareholders of existing 
companies may profit from insider trading opportunities, if the law is lax. In contrast, 
startup companies need a substantial infusion of external finance, so that the cost of 
equity capital is critical to their viability and growth. Established business will therefore 
tend to favor lax insider trading rules and weak enforcement, whereas potential entrants 
and shareholders at large will prefer strict rules and tough enforcement. This divergence 
of interests parallels the contrast between incumbents and new entrepreneurs on the 
issue of shareholder protection mentioned in section 2.1. 
An interesting case study on the importance of securities market regulation is 
provided by Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer (2001), who compare the regulation of 
financial markets in Poland and the Czech Republic in the 1990s. The two countries 
started from a similar past (they both emerged to democracy in 1989 after more than 40 
years under Communism) and they embarked on a similar path of economic reforms 
(privatization, price and trade liberalization, competition policy, banking reform, and 
financial institutions). By 1994, both countries had completed most economic reforms, 
with very similar results regarding the development of their overall legal design and 
enforcement system.  For instance, in evaluating the confidence in the fair 
administration of justice the 1996 Global Competitiveness Report gave a 2.93 rating 
(out of 6) to the Czech Republic and 2.92 to Poland. 
Although many of the reforms were similar, the two countries followed different 
approaches to the regulation of financial markets. In Poland, stringent securities markets 
rules were imposed and strictly enforced by an independent securities surveillance 
commission, whereas in the Czech Republic regulations were lax and loosely enforced 
by the Capital Markets Supervisors Office of the Ministry of Finance. Financial 
intermediaries in Poland had to satisfy elaborate licensing requirements and tests, and 
engage in “honest trading” as interpreted by the Commission under the penalty of losing 
their license. The Czech Republic had more pro-forma licensing for brokers with easy   26 
exams, no warning concerning “honest trading” and no real power of the regulator to 
revoke licenses. Moreover, in contrast with the Czech Republic, Poland mandated 
extensive information disclosure by securities issuers and intermediaries.  
The implications of this different regulatory regime were soon to be seen. In 1994 the 
Czech Republic had a stock market capitalization over GDP of 14.9 percent while 
Poland 3.3 percent. Four years later, in 1998 the market capitalization in the Czech 
Republic was 24.2 percent of GDP and in Poland 14.1 percent. During those four years, 
there was no IPO on the Czech stock market and 142 on the Polish stock market; no 
capital was raised through public issues in the Czech Republic and $2,519.1 million in 
Poland. In the Czech Republic, the word “tunneling” was created to indicate cases of 
extreme expropriation of minority shareholders by managers. In step with the different 
degree of financial development, also the real performance of the two economies 
diverged. Between 1991 and 1998, the index of industrial production grew from 73.6 to 
127.4 in Poland and decreased from 113.3 to 109.7 in the Czech Republic.  
What can explain the two countries’ different regulatory choices? According to 
Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer, “the differences in regulatory approaches between 
Poland and the Czech Republic were arguably shaped by ideological differences 
between the two governments,” with the Czech government favoring a “hands-off 
approach” and the Polish authorities preferring a more strictly regulated marketplace. In 
our view, it remains an open issue whether these two different ideological approaches 
were dictated by the different power of pre-existing pressure groups (the “incumbents”, 
in Rajan and Zingales’ terminology) in the two countries. For instance, it is well known 
that Czech banks were already quite powerful at the time of the introduction of the 
reforms: they may have used their power to prevent the development of securities 
markets and thus avoid competition. 
 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
A common objection to political economy models is that they are hard to test. 
Indeed, these models reduce the set of variables that can be considered truly exogenous, 
precisely because they endogeneize institutional features that in the past were often   27 
taken as exogenous. This reduces the set of predictions that these models are able to 
produce, a problem sometimes compounded by the existence of multiple equilibria. 
Moreover, empirically it may often be difficult to discriminate between ideological 
(or cultural) and economic determinants of political choices. According to the political 
economy approach, only the latter should affect political decisions, but it is hard to rule 
out that ideology and culture also play a role in the policies that shape financial 
architecture.  
Nonetheless, a direct test of models of political economy is possible when data on 
political contributions are available. A growing empirical literature on log-rolling has 
satisfactorily proven that economic interests affect political contributions and political 
decisions. Even if data on political contributions is not available (which is common 
outside the U.S.) there are several opportunities for indirect testing, for instance using 
data on voting behavior or on the relative power of political constituencies. These 
approaches have been applied to the analysis of financial regulation by Berglöf and 
Rosenthal (2000) and Kroszner and Strahan (1999, 2000). 
In addition, often political economy models generate implications that are quite 
distinct from those of competing models. Good examples are the models by Perotti 
(1995) and Biais and Perotti (2001). As we have seen in Section 2.3, these models have 
predictions that relate both the size of IPO underpricing and the frequency of 
privatization sales to measurable political factors. As a result, these predictions have 
been extensively tested alongside those of competing models, and have been found to 
be strongly supported by the data. 
Finally, in many cases applied economists can disregard political economy concerns 
only at the risk of introducing endogeneity biases in their estimates. When policy is 
truly endogenous, to perform any kind of policy evaluation one must identify and 
control for the forces that lead to the policy changes. Otherwise, one risks confounding 
the effects of the policy on economic outcomes and the effect that economic outcomes 
have on the adoption of the policy itself (recall the feedback loop in Figure 1). Of 
course, this problem is present in all the areas of economics, not only in finance. Besley 
and Case (2000) show how one disregarding policy endogeneity in the context of the 
policy on workers’ compensation benefits can lead to biased estimates of its effects, and 
indicate how these biases can be avoided if the policy adoption can be appropriately   28 
instrumented for. Many existing estimates of the effects of specific types of financial 
regulation are likely to suffer from similar biases. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we review the main insights that the political economy approach has so 
far contributed to our understanding of financial regulation. On the whole, this approach 
can help us understand existing international differences in financial regulation. It can 
also help us predict future changes in regulation and in its enforcement, by revealing the 
decision process through which financial reforms are designed and implemented and the 
way in which political constituencies affect policy. By the same token, using this 
approach one can identify instances in which reform is not possible, because the 
existing regulatory regime has entrenched interest groups who can veto reform. 
Understanding the determinants of financial regulation is important because 
regulatory design and enforcement activity affect the development of capital markets 
and thereby economic growth, as shown by the extensive empirical literature on finance 
and growth (see Beck, Levine and Loayaza (2000), Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Carlin and Mayer (1999), among others). 
While the political economy of finance can yield important insights, it is also fair to 
expose the likely limitations of this approach. The main limitations lie in the difficulty 
to take these models to the data, since by their very nature they endogeneize many 
variables that other models treat as exogenous, and correspondingly they reduce the set 
of exogenous variables whose changes can be used to identify relationships in the data. 
Moreover, often it is difficult to discriminate between ideological and economic 
determinants of political choices, as well as to nest political economy models and more 
traditional models in the same specification. However, these difficulties should not be 
exaggerated. We have described several instances in which the data allow testing 
political economy models in the area of finance, and in which the data have provided 
strong support for such models. Finally, ignoring the endogeneity of policy can 
sometimes lead to severely biased estimates of its effects: this applies to the analysis of 
financial regulation no less than to other areas of economics. 
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Table 1. Politics and Finance: A Road Map 
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Table 2. Preferences about Corporate Objectives 
 
 
The table reports the results of a survey carried out on senior managers in a sample of major companies. 
The alternative answers to the first question were: "A company exists for the interest of all stakeholders" 
and "Shareholders' interest should be given the first priority". The alternative answers to the second 
question were: "Executives should maintain dividend payments, even if they must lay off a number of 
employees" and "Executives should maintain stable employment, even if they must reduce dividends". 
Source: Allen and Gale (2000), Figures 2.2 and 2.3. 
 
 
Survey question:  Possible 






97.1 82.7 78.0 24.4 29.5 
The 
shareholders 2.9  17.3 22.0 75.6 70.5  Whose company 
is it? 
Number of 
respondents  68 110 50  82  78 
Job  security  97.1 59.1 60.4 10.8 10.7 
Dividends  2.9  40.9 39.6 89.2 89.3  Which is more 
important? 
Number of 
respondents  68 105 68  83  75 
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Table 3. Coalition Government and Corporatism 
 
 
Coalition Government is the fraction of years in which a given country had coalition governments in the 
period from 1975 (with the following exceptions due to data availability: Australia and Finland, 1976; 
Germany and Portugal, 1977; Spain, 1978) to 1997.  Confidence Vote is a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 in countries where the government must resign if it loses a confidence vote, and 0 otherwise. For 
Canada and New Zealand, it is set equal to 0 because their government could be forced to resign upon 
losing a confidence vote only if it is a minority government, a historically rare occurrence in both 
countries. Corporatist Country is a dummy variable based on the Employment Protection and Shareholder 
Protection data displayed in Figure 2. It equals 1 if Employment Protection is not smaller than 1.5 and 
Shareholder Protection is not larger than 4, and 0 if Employment Protection is larger than 1.5 and 












Australia 0.41  1  0 
Austria 0.61  1  1 
Belgium 1  1  1 
Canada 0  0  0 
Denmark 0.74  1  1 
Finland 1  0  1 
France 1  1  1 
Germany 1  1  1 
Greece 0.13  1  1 
Ireland 0.74  1  0 
Italy 0.74  1  1 
Japan 0.26  1  1 
Netherlands 1  1  1 
New Zealand  0.13  0  0 
Norway 0.83  1 1 
Portugal 0.14  1 1 
Spain 0.05  1  1 
Sweden 0.70  1  1 
Switzerland 1  0  1 
United Kingdom  0.04  0  0 
United States  0  0  0 
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Figure 2. Employee and Shareholder Protection 
 
Employment Protection is the weighted average of indicators on regular contracts 
(procedural inconveniences, notice and severance pay for no-fault individual dismissals, 
difficulty of dismissal), short term contract (fixed-term and temporary), and collective 
dismissals. Values increase with the strictness of protection. Source: OECD, 1999. 
Shareholder Rights is the antidirector rights indicator from Table 2 of La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
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